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Abstract The apparent ubiquity of progressive taxation in advanced democracies
has animated research by political economists in the past decade, but little progress
has been made in modeling political equilibria over tax policy when labor supply
is elastic with respect to taxation. Here, we postulate an economy with two worker
types (wage capacities), in which the unskilled are more numerous than the skilled.
Preferences are quasi-linear in income and leisure. One political party represents each
worker type. A tax policy is any feasible incentive-compatible menu of pre- and post-
tax incomes from which each worker must choose. This policy space is three-dimen-
sional. Workers vote stochastically. The equilibrium concept for political competition
is party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE)—thus, parties are both vote-seeking and
representative. The set of political equilibria is characterized.We prove that, if the class
of unskilled workers is not too large (but greater than one-half), then there always exist
equilibria in which a regressive tax policy wins. If, however, that class is sufficiently
numerous, or inequality is sufficiently great, then the victory of a progressive policy
is guaranteed in all equilibria.
Although mass voting has not been a topic of Salvador Barberà’s research, I offer this paper for this
special issue in his honor, because it represents one of the unfortunately few attempts to bring the issue of
voter incentive compatibility into the study of the politics of income re-distribution through taxation—and
incentive compatibility has been the cornerstone of Salvador’s research program. I emphasize ‘politics,’
because the optimal taxation literature, since Mirrlees (1971), has addressed incentive compatibility—but
as a problem for the social planner. The present paper is an attempt to study Mirrleesian considerations in
the context of political competition. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for acute comments on the first
draft.
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1 Introduction
There have been, in the past decade, a significant number of contributions to the polit-
ical economy of income taxation [Marhuenda and Ortuño-Ortin (1998), Gouveia and
Oliver (1996), Roemer (1999), Carbonell-Nicolau and Klor (2003), De Donder and
Hindriks (2003), Roemer (2006), Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok (2006), Casamatta et al.
(2010), Roemer (2011), and Gomberg et al. (2010);] in many of these papers, the focus
has been on explaining the ubiquity of progressive income taxation. It is most natural
to examine this problem in an environment where the policy space, fromwhich parties
choose an income-tax policy, is multi-dimensional. Because of this, equilibria in the
classical Downsian model of political competition generally fail to exist.
My goal is to study the political competition over income-tax policies in a model
which allows us to achieve four desiderata; that
(1) there be partisan parties, which represent different coalitions of constituents;
(2) worker-voters be characterized by different wage-earning capacities, where the
parties know the distribution of such capacities, but the capacity of individuals
is private information;
(3) worker-voters derive utility from income and leisure, and
(4) policies be unrestricted, except that they must be incentive compatible.
I have italicized the key requirements. None of the papers in the cited literature
present models that achieve all these desiderata. Perhaps the desirability of (2)–(4)
is self-evident. Nevertheless, most of the cited papers avoid the problem of incen-
tive compatibility, by assuming that income is inelastically produced. I claim (1) is
important as well, although it is not often implemented in the formal literature. An
assumption frequently made by political economists, that parties are purely opportun-
ist institutions that aim solely to maximize vote share, or their probability of victory,
is unrealistic: in mature democracies, parties do not survive if they do not attempt to
represent constituent interests. Indeed, the formal literature in this regard has been, in
my view, insufficiently sensitive to non-formal political science, which is overwhelm-
ingly concerned with studying parties that are, to some extent at least, institutions that
represent coalitions of citizens.
In his classic paper, Mirrlees (1971) carried out a normative analysis of tax policy
under assumptions (2)–(4). The present study is the beginning of an attempt to imple-
ment the Mirrlees program in a positive framework—that is, when political competi-
tion between parties representing citizen coalitions determines tax policy, rather than
a benevolent government. The only other attempt along similar lines, of which I am
aware, is the recent work of Boyer and Bierbrauer (2010).
The political equilibrium concept I use is party-unanimity Nash equilibrium
(PUNE). This concept was introduced in Roemer (1999, 2001); it models parties
as run by politicians who care both about winning and representation of constituents.
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In my earlier study of the politics of taxation, however, workers derived utility only
from income, not leisure, and so the issue of incentive compatibility did not arise.
Working with a continuum of types, and demanding the desiderata 1 through 4
above, would pose an intractable problem. It would require solving two Mirrlees
optimal tax problems, which are interdependent, as the reader will see below.1 I there-
fore opt to simplify the environment drastically, in order to be able to implement the
declared desiderata.
After presenting some preliminaries in the next section, Sect. 3 defines political
equilibrium, Sect. 4 characterizes the set of Pareto efficient policies and second-best
efficient policies, Sect. 5 characterizes the set of political equilibria, and Sect. 6 dis-
cusses the extent to which victorious policies are redistributive or progressive.
2 Preliminaries
We assume that there are only two types of worker, characterized by different wage
capacities, 1 and θ > 1,present in population fractions p and1−p,where the unskilled
type comprises a majority (p > 0.5).2 Let ρ = p1−p > 1.We assume as well that pref-
erences are quasi-linear, represented by the utility function u(x, L) = x − g(L), x
is income and L is labor, where g is a convex, increasing, continuously differentiable
function, normalized so that g(0) = 0. The labor (leisure) endowment of each worker
is one. These two simplifying assumptions will render the problem analytically trac-
table.
The set of symmetric feasible income-labor allocations is:
F = {(y1, L1, y2, L2)|y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0, 1 ≥ L1 ≥ 0, 1 ≥ L2 ≥ 0,
py1 + (1 − p)y2 ≤ pL1 + (1 − p)θ L2}.
We consider only symmetric allocations and policies—ones which treat all members
of a type identically. An allocation in F is Pareto efficient if there is no other allocation
in F that renders at least one of the types better off without diminishing the utility of
either type. Denote the set of Pareto efficient allocations by P.
A tax policy is a vector τ = (y1, x1, y2, x2) ∈ R4 where the taxing authority intends
that the low (high) type will choose to produce income x1(x2) and will receive as post-
fisc income, y1(y2). Tax policies must be incentive compatible to be attainable. An












) ≥ u (y1, x1θ
)
(incentive compatibility, high agent)
(IC1) if x2 ≤ 1, then u(y1, x1) ≥ u(y2, x2) (incentive compatibility, low agent)
(P1) u(y1, x1) ≥ 0 (participation constraint, low agent)
The (unstated) participation constraint for the high agent follows from (IC2) and
(P1). We denote the set of attainable policies by A. Trivially, we can write A as the
1 In my formulation, it would involve a Nash equilibrium between two players, in which part of the strategy
of each player requires solving a Mirrleesian optimal tax problem.
2 This corresponds to the common assumption that the median wage is less than the mean wage.
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union of two sets, A = A1 ∪ A2 where:
A1 = {τ |x2 > 1}, A2 = {τ |x2 ≤ 1}.
In general, neither of the sets A1 or A2, nor their union, is convex.
We say a tax policy (attainable or not) is Pareto efficient if the allocation it would
induce, were it implemented, is Pareto efficient. We will also, hopefully without con-
fusion, denote the set of Pareto efficient tax policies by P. We say a tax policy is
second-best efficient (SBE) if it is in A and it is not Pareto-dominated by another
policy in A. Denote the set of SBE policies by P(A).





We will study below what we call the interior case, in which:
(I1) 0 < L(ω) < 1, for ω ∈ {1, θ}
(I2) θ L(θ) > 1.
(I2) tells us that if a tax policy specifies that x2 = θ L(θ), then the unskilled agent
cannot possibly imitate the skilled one, and so the constraint (IC1) is nugatory.
Of course it follows from (I1) that we have
g′(L(ω)) = ω, ω ∈ {1, θ}. (2.1)
3 Voting and political equilibrium
A tax policy is a menu, where each worker may choose either of the proposed pre-
and post-fisc income pairs. The utility of voters over policies in A is defined in the
obvious way. Denote the indirect utility function of a voter of type ω on the policy
space A by v(·;ω). Then




and v(y1, x1, y2, x2; 1) = y1 − g(x1).
Of course, we use here the fact that the worker chooses the part of the policy menu
which gives him or her greater utility.
There are two political parties, which we denote H and L , and which represent
high and low type citizens, respectively. We assume that, when facing two policies
τ L , τ H proposed by parties L and H, a worker of type ω votes for policy τ L when










3 Under the laissez-faire policy, each worker keeps what she produces.
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where ε is a random variable distributed according to a normal distribution, with mean
zero, whose distribution function we denote by N and whose density we denote by n.
The stochastic term is taken to be i.i.d. across voters.
Thus, the probability that a given worker of type ω votes for τ L is N (v(τ L ;ω) −
v(τ H ;ω)). Because there is a continuum of each type, and the error term is iid, the
fraction of the vote the L policy will receive is
π
(






























τ L , τ H
)
























The two political parties are each managed by political entrepreneurs, who belong
to one of two factions: the Opportunists or the Guardians. These factions bargain with
each other in the face of the other party’s policy proposal. We represent this bargaining
as follows: the Opportunists choose a policy to maximize the vote share of their party,
subject to a constraint which the Guardians insist upon, that the policy not deliver too
low a utility to those citizens whom the party represents.
Definition A political equilibrium (PE) is a pair of policies (τ L , τ R) ∈ A2 and a pair
of numbers (kL , k H ) ∈ R2 such that:






subj. to v(τ ; 1) ≥ kL
(E1b) the constraint in the program in (E1a) binds;






τ L , τ
))
subj. to v(τ ; θ) ≥ k H
(E2b) the constraint in program (E2a) binds;
(E3) v(τ L ; 1) ≥ v(τ H ; 1) and v(τ H ; θ) ≥ v(τ L ; θ).
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Condition (E1a) says that the policy τ L is the outcome of efficient bargaining
between the Opportunists and Guardians in Party L; (E2a) makes the analogous state-
ment for party H ; and (E3) says that each party’s policy is favored by its constituency.
The conditions (E1b) and (E2b) simply say that the bargaining between the factions
is tight.
We have:
Proposition 1 If (τ L , τ H ) is a political equilibrium, then (τ L , τ H ) ∈ P(A)× P(A).
Proof Suppose that one policy in a PE is not SBE, say τ L . Moving to a Pareto-
dominating policy will increase the objective function of the L party, which is given
in (3.1a), without violating the kL constraint. unionsq
Remark Supposewe assumed a continuum ofworker types.We could formulate a def-
inition of political equilibrium with two parties, each representing the two elements
in a partition of the type space. It is natural, in this case, that the Guardians attempt
to maximize some weighted average of the utility of their constituents. This, indeed,
is the concept of PUNE in the above-cited literature. We could thus characterize the
bargaining problem within each party as the maximization of the constituents’ aver-
age utility subject to a constraint that the vote share not fall below a specified level.
Thus, each party would be solving a ‘constrained’ Mirrlees tax problem, given the tax
policy proposed by the other party. This is an intractable problem, at least for a general
analysis. This remark motivates our decision to study the two-type world.
4 The Pareto set and the second-best efficient set
From Proposition 1, it is clear that to characterize the set of equilibria, it will be helpful
to understand the SBE set of policies.








, L(1), θ L(θ) − δ, θ L(θ)
)
, where
−ρL(1) ≤ δ ≤ θ L(θ)
}
.
In other words, the Pareto set is very simple: each worker type produces his optimal
laissez-faire income; then each high type is taxed δ and each low type receives the
transfer δ/ρ, where δ lies in a given interval. The simplicity of the Pareto set is the
purchase of quasi-linearity.
Proof 1. Suppose τ is a feasible (not necessarily attainable) policy and x2 	= θ L(θ).
Construct a new policy by changing x2 in the direction of θ L(θ), and giving the
skilled agent the extra income so generated (assuming x2 < θ L(θ)), or reducing
his income by the amount of income lost (if x2 > θ L(θ)). This changewill increase
the skilled agent’s utility—by quasi-linearity—and it will not affect the utility of
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the low agent.4 Hence τ was not Pareto efficient. In like manner, we prove that
x1 = L(1).
2. The restriction on δ merely says that each agent must receive non-negative income.
3. The budget constraint is embodied in the way the transfer is formulated.
4. Conversely, it is clear that any policy in P is efficient: for production is fixed, and
any way of allocating total output between the agents is therefore efficient. Any
other feasible policy would have to change one of the agents’ labor supplies, and
we have shown such an allocation cannot be efficient. unionsq
We may now characterize the SBE set of policies. First, define δ = ρ(g(L(1)) −





− L(1) and let x∗1 be the solution






Theorem 1 5 Suppose g′(0) < pθ
θ+p−1 . Then P(A) = B1 ∪ B2 where
B1 ⊂ P and B2 = P(A)\P, where
B1 =
{
τ ∈ P|y1 = L(1) + δ
ρ






(y1, x1, y2, x2)|x2 = θ L(θ), x∗1 ≤ x1 ≤ L(1), and (x1, y1, y2) solves.






Theorem 1 states that P(A) comprises part of the Pareto set of policies plus a
one-parameter set of attainable policies in which the skilled agent continues to work
at his optimal laissez-faire production, but the unskilled worker works less than his
laissez-faire optimal level.
It is helpful to visualize the utility possibilities of the second-best efficient set, which
is depicted in Fig. 1. The origin of the space in the figure is the utility pair generated
at the laissez-faire allocation. Marks on the axes of the figure indicate deviations from
the laissez-faire utilities. The policies in B1 generate the straight line segment ab;
policies on the segments bβ and aα are efficient but unattainable; policies on the arc
âc are those in B2. These are SBE but not efficient.
Proof of theorem 1: 1. First, we show that B1 = P ∩ A. Since x2 = θ L(θ) > 1, the
unskilled agent cannot imitate the skilled agent at an efficient policy. It follows that
P ∩ A is the intersection of P with the set of policies such that:








4 For instance, if x2 < θ L(θ) then note that θε − g( x2θ + ε) is increasing for small positive ε, because
θ > g′( x2
θ
), by convexity of g and Eq. (2.1).
5 The premise of the theorem serves to simplify the characterization of P(A); if it is dropped, the qualitative
results do not change, by the statement becomes more complex.
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Fig. 1 Frontier of the utility possibilities set
(P1) L(1) + δ
ρ
− g(L(1)) ≥ 0.
These two constraints immediately imply that δ ≤ δ ≤ δ¯, proving the claim of this
step.
2. There are no attainable policies with the utility of the unskilled agent less than he
receives at the policy defined by δ, because his utility there is zero.
3. The policies in B2 are SBE but not efficient. Consider the set of such policies,
which we must establish is non-empty. We observe that at any such policy, we
must have x2 = θ L(θ). For suppose not: then alter x2 to θ L(θ), and give (or take)
the changed income so generated to the skilled agent. This increases the skilled
agent’s utility and does not alter the utility of the unskilled agent. Moreover, the
new policy is attainable. Hence the original policy was not SBE.
Therefore, if SB E\P 	= ∅, then in any such policy, x1 	= L(1). I claim that (IC2)
binds at such a policy: for suppose to the contrary that
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Then alter x1 a small amount in the direction of L(1) and give (take) the resultant
change in income to (from) the unskilled agent. (IC2) will still be slack, and the
new policy is therefore attainable but Pareto dominates the given one.
4. It follows that any policy in SB E\P is of the form (y1, x1, y2, θ L(θ)) where
px1 + (1 − p)θ L(θ) = py1 + (1 − p)y2, and (4.1)





We may view this as a one-parameter family of policies parameterized by x1.
Viewing y1 and y2 as functions of x1 we compute from (4.1) and (4.2), invoking
the implicit function theorem, that:
dy1
dx1


















5. We write the utility of the unskilled agent at such a policy as























which uses the fact that g′(L(1)) = 1.Nownote that by (I2), θ L(θ) > L(1), and by
















(L(1)) < 0. Consequently, reducing x1 at L(1) along the path
described by (4.1) and (4.2) will indeed increase the utility of the low agent, while
decreasing the utility of the high agent. Thus, the points so generated are SBE.
6. How far can x1 be decreased? Until the utility of the unskilled agent reaches a
maximum, which occurs when dU (x1)dx = 0, that is, when







This is the equation that defines x∗1 just before the theorem’s statement. We know
that x∗1 > 0 because
dU
dx (0) = p + 1−pθ g′(0) − g′(0), which is positive by the
inequality stated in the theorem’s premise. So the claim follows from the intermediate
value theorem. unionsq
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5 Characterization of political equilibria








, and denote, for any pair
of policies τ L and τ H , (τ L , τ H ; 1) = v(τ L ; 1) − v(τ H ; 1) and (τ L , τ H ; θ) =
v(τ L ; θ) − v(τ H ; θ). If x ∈ [x∗1 , L(1)], denote the policy on the arc âc for which
x1 = x by τ(x) = (y1(x), x, y2(x), θ L(θ)). (The functions y1(·) and y2(·) are given
in Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2).)
In what follows, we sometimes refer to policies by their names in Fig. 1.
Theorem 2 A. Let τ H ∈ P(A) be arbitrary, except τ H 	= τ(x∗1 ). Then there is a
unique value x˜, which depends upon τ H , with x∗1 < x˜ < L(1), such that (τ L , τ H )
is a political equilibrium when τ L = τ(x), any x ∈ [x∗1 , x˜]. If τ H = τ(x∗1 ), then
(τ (x∗1 ), τ (x∗1 )) is a political equilibrium. This exhausts the set of political equilibria.
B. If τ H 	= τ(x∗1 ) and L plays τ(x˜), where x˜ is defined in part A, then L wins more
than half the votes.
Proof Part A.
1. Both parties play a policy which is SBE, by Proposition 1, and by condition (E3)
of the definition of equilibrium, the H party must play a policy that does not lie
to the southeast of the L policy (the direction refers to Fig. 1). The cases we must
examine are the following:
(a) Both parties play a policy on the line segment ab, and L does not play a.
(b) H plays a policy on ab and L plays a.
(c) H plays a policy on ab and L plays a policy in âc.
(d) Both parties play a policy in âc.
We shall examine some of these statements; the rest yield to similar arguments.
2. Note first that if τ L and τ H are distinct equilbrium policies played by the two
parties, then we must have
∣
∣(τ L , τ R; θ)∣∣ ≥ ρ ∣∣(τ L , τ R; 1)∣∣ > ∣∣(τ L , τ R; 1)∣∣ ;
this follows fromFig. 1. It therefore follows thatn((τ L ,τ R; θ))<n((τ L ,τ R; 1)),
where n(·) is the density function of N .
3. In case (a) of Step 1, (τ L , τ H ) is not a political equilibrium.
It will suffice to show that L can increase its objective function of (E1) [see
Eq. (3.1a)] by increasing the transfer to type L . In this case, the policies of L
and H are each characterized by numbers δL and δR, δL ≥ δR . The objective






+ N (δR − δ) ≡ (δ),





−n(δR−δL). If δL > δR,weobserve
that this expression is positive, because ρ > 1 and n(δL − δR) = n(δR − δL). If
δL = δR, then ′(δL) = 0 and compute that ′′(δL) = n′(0)
ρ







> 0, because n′′(0) < 0.Note we here employ the fact
that ρ >1. Therefore, in either case, the claim is proved.
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4. In case (b) of Step 1, (τ L , τ H ) is not a political equilibrium.
We study the case where τ L 	= τ R . In this case, L proposes the transfer δ¯ and H
proposes a transfer δR < δ¯. We again will show that L can increase the value of
its objective function by deviating onto the arc

ac which means decreasing x1. We
write L’s objective function as a function of x1 along the SBE path:
(x1) = ρN (y1(x1) − g(x1) − v(τ H ; 1)) + N (y2(x1) − g(L(θ)) − v(τ H ; θ)),
where the functions y1 and y2 are those defined in equations (4.1) and (4.2). We







































We have proved (see step 5 of the proof of Theorem 1) that the term in the first
set of brackets on the r.h.s. is positive. The term in the second set of brackets is
negative, so the derivative is negative. Therefore, if L decreases the value of x1,
its objective increases—and utility increases, so the move is feasible. The claim is
proved.
5. We now consider cases (c) and (d); that is, assume that L plays a policy in the
arc âc. Let L’s policy be τ L = (y1, x1, y2, θ L(θ)) where (y1, y2) are given by
Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2). Fix H ’s policy at τ H ; in this step we consider the case where
τ H ∈ ab.
The fraction of the vote going to party L is
ϕ(x1) = pN (y1(x1) − g(x1) − v(τ H ; 1)) + (1 − p)N (y2(x1) − g(L(θ))
−v(τ H ; θ)).





τ L , τ H ; 1
))(




























































τ L , τ H ; 1
))










τ L , τ H ; 1
))
. (5.1)
Note that A(L(1)) = B(L(1)), and so












τ L , τ H ; 1
)))
< 0,
where the last inequality follows from the facts that A(L(1)) > 0 and
n((τ L , τ H ; θ))−n((τ L , τ H ; 1)) < 0, this last being from step 2 above. There-
fore, it is surely the case that party L should reduce x1 from L(1) and move onto
the arc âc. This move will appeal to both its Guardians and Opportunists.
Let us now evaluate ϕ′(x∗1 ). Observe that B(x∗1 ) = p A(x∗1 ); therefore, ϕ′(x∗1 ) =
p A(x∗1 )(1− p)n((τ L , τ R; θ)) > 0. It follows by the intermediate value theorem
that there is a value x˜, L(1) < x˜ < x∗1 , at which ϕ′(x˜) = 0; L must move at least
to the policy τ(x˜) on the arc âc, for this will be in the interest of both its Opportu-
nists and Guardians. There is an appropriate condition on the second derivative of
g which will guarantee that the value x˜ is unique.
Indeed, given τ H , the policy τ L(x˜) = (y1(x˜), x˜, y2(x˜), θ L(θ)) where x˜ is deter-












τ L(x˜), τ H ; 1)) . (5.2)
We have noted that such a value of x˜ exists.
It now follows that, in responding to τ H , L must play a policy τ(x) for some
x ∈ [x∗1 , x˜], for these are precisely the policies in which there is conflict between
theOpportunists andGuardians in L .How far into the interval [x∗1 , x˜] toward x∗1 L
moves is determined by how high the value of kL is—that is, how militant the L
Guardians are.
To verify that H ’s policy is indeed an equilibrium response to τ L(x˜),we need only
observe that to increase its vote share, H would have to deviate towards τ L(x˜);
but such a deviation would violate the constraint E(2b) if k H = v(τ H ; θ). So any
such pair (τ H , τ (x)) is a political equilibrium.
6. Now choose τ H ∈ âc, τ H 	= τ(x∗1 ); let the value of x1 at this policy be
denoted x H1 . Let τ
L be any policy on the arc âc that lies between τ H and c.
Observe that Eq. (5.1) continues to hold. Compute, using (5.1), that ϕ′(x H1 ) =
pn(0)
(
A(x H1 ) − B(x H1 )
)
> 0. As in step 4, we have ϕ′(x∗1 ) < 0 : so, as in the
argument of step 4, there is a (unique) value x˜ ∈ (x∗1 , x R1 ) up to which L can move,
increasing both its vote fraction and the utility of its Guardians (constituents).
Consequently, as in step 4, any pair (τ H , τ L(x)) for x ∈ [x∗1 , x H1 ] is a political
equilibrium.
7. Finally, suppose that τ R = c. Then (c, c) is the unique political equilibrium.
Part B.
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8. As long as τ H 	= τ(x˜) in an equilibriumwhere τ L = τ(x˜), H ’s vote fraction will
increase if it moves towards τ L . (This is verified by recapitulating the computation
in step 4 with an appropriate change of notation.) The vote fraction for H is thus
strictly increasing on such a path, and achieves the value of one-half when H ′s
policy coincides with τ L . Hence, except in the equilibrium when both H and L
play the same policy, L wins more than half the vote.
If, however, L plays a policy more redistributive than τ(x˜), its vote share could fall
below one-half. unionsq
Qualitatively, Theorem 2 says that in all political equilibria, party L plays a policy
that is more progressive, in the sense of more redistributive, than the most progressive
Pareto efficient policy.
Here is an intuition for Theorem 2. The two critical premises are that (i) the low type
form a majority, and that (ii) the noise in voter choice is normally distributed. Since
there are more low than high types, if party L transfers consumption from high types
to low types, the per capita gain of each low type is less than the per capita loss of each
high type. By assumption (ii), voting behavior of agents is more responsive when the
utility difference between parties’ offers is small. Hence, transferring consumption
towards the low types increases the vote share of party L (the party gains more L
votes than the H votes it loses) as long as the proposals remain on the flat segment
of the SBE set. Thus as party L moves its policy along the flat segment of the SBE
set towards point a, it wins more votes and increases its constituents’ welfare. When
we reach the curved segment âc, things get more complicated, because continuing to
transfer from the high types to the low types is increasingly costly in terms of the high
type’s utility. The proof shows there is a limit to how much can be transferred to the
low types before the L vote share begins to fall. At a policy which is part of a PUNE,
it must be the case that the party’s vote share and the constituents’ utility move in
opposite directions.6
We note, as is usual with PUNE, that there is a 2-manifold of equilibria. We can
first choose τ H to be any SBE policy; this defines the number x˜, which then specifies
the interval in which the policy τ L must lie.
6 On progressivity
Define a policy τ ∈ P(A) as progressive if it is at least as redistributive as the laissez-
faire policy: either τ ∈ âc or τ ∈ ba and δ > 0. An SBE policy that is not progressive
is regressive. As a tie-breaking convention, call the laissez-faire policy regressive. In
Roemer (1999), conditions upon the environment were provided which implied that,
with probability one, a progressive policy would win the election (where progressivity
was defined for the particular [quadratic tax] policy space of that article). As I indi-
cated in the introduction, the apparent ubiquity of progressive taxation in advanced
democracies has been an animating question for political economy. Is it the case that
progressive policies will always win, in the present environment?
6 I am grateful to the referee for supplying this intuition.
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Consider the political equilibrium where party H plays laissez-faire, τ H = τL F =
(L(1), L(1), θ L(θ), θ L(θ)) and the L party plays its ideal policy, τ L = τ(x∗1 ). We
have:
Proposition 3 In any political equilibrium, the winning [majority] policy will be pro-
gressive if and only if the L party receives at least half the vote in the contest between
τL F and τ(x∗1 ).
Proof Thepolitical equilibrium (τL F , τ (x∗1 ))maximizes the vote fraction that a regres-
sive policy can receive, over the set of political equilibria. If H plays any more regres-
sive policy, its vote share falls; if L plays any less redistributive policy, its vote share
rises. The claim follows. unionsq
Consequently, to decide whether progressive policies are guaranteed to win, we
need only evaluate the fraction of the vote going to L party in the contest between
τL F and τ(x∗1 ). This fraction is:
 = pN (y1 − g(x∗1 ) − L(1) + g(L(1))) + (1 − p)N (y2 − θ L(θ))) (6.1)
where (x∗1 , y1, y2) is the solution of the three Eqs. (4.1), (4.2), and (4.5).
We present an example. Let g(L) = α2 L2, and θ2 > α > θ > 1. The postulates of
the model are satisfied. We have L(ω) = ω
α
, ω ∈ {1, θ}. Let N be the distribution
function of a normal variate with mean zero and standard deviation σ . We solve for
(x∗1 , y1, y2) and compute, using Mathematica, that  > 0.5 if and only if :











In Fig. 2, I graph as a function of θ for various values of the parameters (p, α, σ ),
in each case letting θ run over the acceptable range θ ∈ (√α, α). We see that, in all
cases, there are some values of θ for which the regressive policy wins. We furthermore
see from these examples that there is no simple relationship between the mean:median
wage ratio and the fraction who vote for the redistributive policy—in some cases,
increasing ‘skewness’ reduces the support for the L policy, and in others it increases
it.
There thus appears to be no guarantee that, even if the median wage is less than the
mean (the case in this paper), a progressive tax policy will win the election.
In the next result, we generalize from this example.
Theorem 3 Let N be the normal variate with mean zero and standard deviation σ .
Let g be any strictly convex cost function as in our model, for which the interior case
holds. Then:
A. If p is sufficiently close to 0.5 (and p > 0.5) then there always exist political equi-
libria in which a regressive policy wins.
B. If p is sufficiently close to 1, then in all political equilibria, a progressive policy
wins.
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Fig. 2 The L party vote fraction as a function of θ at the equilibrium (τL F , τ (x∗1 )) when g(L) = α2 L2
Proof 1. For part A, wemust show that, at p = 0.5,we have < 0.5. This condition
is equivalent to:
N (C) + N (D) < 1 (6.3)
where
C = −L(1) + g(L(1)) − g(x∗1 ) + .5
(














(To see this, solve (4.1) and (4.2) for y1 and y2 in terms of x1 and substitute into
expression (6.1).) One can check that C > 0 and D < 0. Therefore, (6.3) is true
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iff C + D < 0. But this last inequality is equivalent to:
g(L(1)) − g(x∗1 )
L(1) − x∗1
< 1. (6.4)
Recall that g′(L(1)) = 1; since g is a strictly convex function, by the theorem’s
premise, and x∗1 < L(1),we know that g′ is less than one in the interval [x∗1 , L(1)).
But this implies (6.4), and Part A is proved.
2. To prove Part B, we must show that  > 12 for p close to 1. Compute that at
p = 1, = 12 . It therefore suffices to show that  is decreasing as p approaches













− N (y2(1) − θ L(θ))
= 1
2
+ n(0) (Q∗ − L(1)) − N (Q∗) (6.5)





− θ L(θ). It therefore suffices to show
that
− n(0)Q∗ + N (Q∗) > 1
2
. (6.6)
Note that the l.h.s. of (6.6) equals one-half at Q = 0, and is a decreasing function
at Q < 0. Therefore (6.6) is true, since Q∗ < 0, which establishes the theorem. unionsq
Part A of proposition4 tells us that there can be no general presumption that, when
the median wage is less than the mean wage (i.e., p > 0.5), progressive tax policies
will win elections. Part B, however, says, perhaps not surprisingly, that if the unskilled
type is sufficiently numerous, then, progressivity is guaranteed.
In our model, the median wage is one (as long as p > 0.5) and the mean wage is
p+(1− p)θ.Themean:median ratio, often called ‘skewness’ in the political-economy
literature, is p+(1− p)θ. In somemodels with a unidimensional policy space of affine
taxes, the degree of redistribution in political equilibrium is positively correlated with
skewness. It may be worth observing that Theorem 3 is a result of the opposite kind:
progressivity is guaranteed when skewness is very close to one, but is not guaranteed
when skewness is large (at p = 0.5).
Finally, we study the effect of inequality on progressivity. The value of θ , being the
ratio of wages of the two types, is clearly a measure of inequality. We have:
Theorem 4 Suppose that:
(a) g′(0) < p, and
(b) lim g(L) = ∞.
L→1
Then for θ sufficiently large, we are in the interior case, and a progressive policy wins
in all PUNEs.
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Proof 1. By assumption (a), the premise of Theorem 1 holds for all θ . By assump-
tion (b), lim
L→1 g
′(L) = ∞; it follows immediately that for all θ, L(θ) < 1. Since
g′(L(θ)) = θ, we have L(θ) → 1 as θ becomes large. It immediately follows that
the conditions of interiority hold. Thus Theorems 1 and 2 are true for θ sufficiently
large.
2. Consequently, to prove the progressivity claim, it suffices to verify that for
large θ, > 0.5: see Eq. (6.1). It clearly suffices to demonstrate that
(y1(θ) − g(x∗1 (θ))) → ∞ with θ, for then the first term on the right-hand side
of (6.1) will approach p, while the second term is non-negative. Hence the result
will be proved, because p > 0.5.





= g′(x∗1 (θ)). Since x∗1 (θ) is
bounded above by one, it immediately follows that lim
θ→∞ x
∗
1 (θ) = x∗∗, where x∗∗
is defined by the equation g′(x∗∗) = p. In particular, the derivative, dx∗1 (θ)dθ → 0
as θ → ∞.
4. We wish to compute ddθ (y1(θ) − g(x∗1 (θ))); by step 3, we see that the second term
in this expression approaches zero. Hence we are interested in y′1(θ). Differentiat-
ing Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2) implicitly w.r.t. θ, using step 3, recalling that g′(L(θ)) = θ,




1(θ) = 1 − p.
It therefore follows that lim
θ→∞ y1(θ) = ∞. Therefore (y1(θ) − g(x
∗
1 (θ))) → ∞,
and the theorem is proved. unionsq
In sum, if either the unskilled type is sufficiently numerous or the skill differential
is sufficiently large, then a progressive tax policy wins in political competition.
7 Extension to more than two types
This appears to be very difficult; it is not easy to characterize the set P(A) in the three-
type case. With three types, one party will represent two types—its Guardians, let us
say,will seek tomaximize their average utility; the other party represents the remaining
type. I conjecture that in equilibrium, it is again always the case that L plays a policy
that is not efficient—but it must play a SBE policy (Proposition 1 continues to hold).
In the (quasi-linear) model with a continuum of types, it can be shown that the
unique Pareto efficient incentive compatible policy is the laissez-faire policy. The
structure of the SBE set must be quite complex.
8 Conclusion
In his classic work, Mirrlees analyzed tax policy from a normative viewpoint, in an
environment with asymmetric information on skills. While a transition in economic
practice has occurred in recent years, from the normative to the positive standpoint
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regarding government behavior, there has been little attempt to carry out the Mirrlees
program in a positive model: that is, to study political-economic equilibrium over tax
policy when political actors (the parties) must propose incentive compatible tax pol-
icies (an exception is De Donder and Hindriks (2003)). The present paper is a small
step in such a program—albeit with two strong simplifying assumptions, to gain trac-
tability: that there are only two types of worker, and that preferences are quasi-linear.
I have postulated, classically, that the mean wage is greater than the median wage.
This is the only distributive assumption. Often, in the literature, this assumption drives
a result that progressive taxationwill be victorious in political competition.We charac-
terize the set of political equilibria in tax-policy competition. It is a two dimensional
manifold (this is due to our PUNE approach), in which the party representing the
majority group of unskilled workers always proposes significant redistribution—in
the sense that the redistribution is more extreme than any Pareto efficient redistribu-
tion. The party representing the skilled workers can propose any policy, depending on
how tough its Guardian faction is.
We proved that, if the class of unskilled workers is not too large, then there always
exist political equilibria in which a regressive tax policy will (almost surely) win the
election. Intuitively, this will only happen if theGuardians in the L party are quite pow-
erful (that is, in the internal party bargaining game) and theOpportunists in the H party
are quite powerful. Thus there can be no universal presumption that democracy entails
progressive taxation. However, if either the class of unskilled workers is sufficiently
large, or the skill differential is sufficiently great, then progressivity is guaranteed.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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